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ABSTRACT: The paper offers a running commentary on ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and 
Sense Perception, with the aim to provide a clear description of Hellenistic/post-
Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology. Through an analysis of the process of knowledge 
and of the faculties that this involves, ps-Archytas presents an original epistemological 
theory which, although grounded in Aristotelian and Platonic theories, results in a 
peculiar Pythagorean criteriology that accounts for the acquisition and production of 
knowledge, as well as for the specific competences of each cognitive faculty.  
SOMMARIO: L’articolo offre un commentario dell’opera Sull’intelletto e la sensazione dello 
Pseudo-Archita, con l’obiettivo di chiarire cosa sia l’epistemologia pitagorica in epoca 
ellenistica/post-ellenistica. Attraverso la descrizione del processo conoscitivo e delle 
facoltà in esso coinvolte, lo Pseudo-Archita presenta un’originale teoria della conoscenza 
che, pur affondando le proprie radici in nozioni platoniche e aristoteliche, si traduce in 
una peculiare criteriologia pitagorica e rende conto tanto dell’acquisizione e della 
produzione della conoscenza quanto delle specifiche competenze di ciascuna facoltà 
conoscitiva.  
KEYWORDS: Hellenistic Pythagoreanism; Epistemology; Pseudepigrapha; Ps-Archytas; 
Theory of Knowledge 
1. Introduction  
1.1. The Problem of Hellenistic Pythagoreans  
A formidable challenge presents itself to those who would like to know 
something about Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology: how, exactly, to 
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define ‘Pythagorean’ in relation to the Hellenistic period.1 As we will see, 
some doxographical accounts whose information can be confidently dated to 
the post-Hellenistic period, usually associated with the closing of the 
philosophical schools in Athens in 86 BCE, but prior to the dramatic 
transformation of Pythagoreanism under the Neoplatonists (especially 
Iamblichus of Chalcis) in the middle of the 3rd century CE, demonstrate the 
close connections between Pythagoreanism and Middle Platonism.2 This 
evidence, while fundamental for constructing a framework for Hellenistic 
Pythagorean epistemology, is apt to colour our views with a certain hue and 
cannot be isolated from other sources. Our best evidence is a series of 
pseudepigraphical treatises ascribed to certain Early Pythagoreans who lived 
prior to the dissolution of the Pythagorean philosophical communities in the 
middle of the 4th century BCE and written in an affected Doric.3 Dating 
these texts is challenging and fraught with difficulties, but the consensus view 
is that they were likely to have been composed between the 1st century BCE 
and the 1st century CE.4 We hold the view that, whoever actually wrote them 
down, the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha which take the form of 
                                                                          
1 This article is co-authored by Giulia De Cesaris and Phillip Horky, who worked 
together on the document as a whole. Each author, however, is primarily responsible for 
these sections: De Cesaris 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4; Horky 1.1, 1.2, 2.5, 2.6. they are equally 
responsible for the conclusions in 3. All translations are by Horky, unless otherwise 
mentioned. The authors would like to thank especially Francesco Verde, Angela Ulacco, 
Federico Petrucci and Mauro Bonazzi for their help at various stages of this article’s 
development.  
2 On post-Hellenistic philosophy, see now G. Boys-Stones, Platonist Philosophy 80 
BC to AD 250: An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 1-6. 
3 We do not refer to these texts as ‘pseudo-Pythagorean’, or to their authors as 
‘pseudo-Pythagoreans’, as is now the common approach today. Instead, we refer to the 
texts as ‘Hellenistic/post-Hellenistic Pythagorean’, and for their authors we apply the 
prefix ‘pseudo-’. The corpus of pseudepigraphical treatises associated with the Early 
Pythagoreans we call the ‘Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha’. For a short explanation for these 
terminological choices, see P. S. Horky, “Pseudo-Archytas’ Protreptics? On Wisdom in its 
Contexts”, in D. Nails-H. Tarrant (eds.), Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato, 
Helsinki, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 2015, p. 21 n. 4. 
4 Cf. A. Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica. I trattati di argomento metafisico, logico ed 
epistemologico attribuiti ad Archita e a Brotino. Introduzione, traduzione, commento, 
Boston-Berlin, de Gruyter, 2017, p. 4-7; B. Centrone, Pseudopythagorica ethica. I trattati 
morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1990, p. 41-44 (chiefly on 
the ethical treatises). 
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philosophical treatises were composed after 150 BCE (at the very earliest), 
when Critolaus of Phaselus, whose arguments evidence connections to some 
of the treatises, was head of the Peripatetic school, and prior to 50 CE, 
when figures such as Philo of Alexandria would appear to demonstrate 
knowledge of their content.5 Hence, the texts would appear to lie at the 
threshold between the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic periods, and they are 
most readily to be associated with the philosophical environs of Alexandria, 
where Eudorus, in particular, describes a kind of Pythagoreanism similar to 
what is found in the pseudepigrapha.6  
Two treatises from the collection of Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha 
arranged and edited by Holger Thesleff7 were explicitly committed to 
expounding Pythagorean epistemology: ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and 
Sense-Perception8 (in two fragments, comprising around 87 lines of Greek) 
and ps-Brontinus’ On Intellect and Discursive Thought9 (in one fragment, 
comprising seven lines of Greek). These texts, together with the fragments 
of ps-Archytas’ On Principles and On Opposites, have been recently edited 
and translated into Italian with a commentary by Angela Ulacco,10 whose 
book explores in detail both textual references and content-related 
connections the treatises entertain with other authors. Therefore, our main 
objective will not be to trace a broad network of references for these texts, 
but rather to give a discursive and holistic account of its content in the 
context of certain passages of Greek philosophy that help to elucidate this 
                                                                          
5 For a recent appraisal, see A. Ulacco, “The Appropriation of Aristotle in the Ps-
Pythagorean Treatises”, in A. Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle 
in Antiquity, Leiden, Brill, 2016, p. 202-205 and 210-212. 
6 Cf. Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 6-7; M. Bonazzi, “Pythagoreanising 
Aristotle: Eudorus and the Systematisation of Platonism”, in M. Schofield (ed.), Aristotle, 
Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC. New Directions for Philosophy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, and Centrone, Pseudopythagorica ethica, p. 
30-34. 
7 H. Thesleff (ed.), The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period, Åbo, Åbo 
Akademi, 1965, which remains the standard text of these fragments (generally accepted by 
Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica). 
8 Title in original Greek: Περὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθάσιος. The first fragment is recorded by 
Stobaeus (Ecl., I, 41, 5 Wachsmuth) as having the title Περὶ ἀρχᾶς (On the First Principle), 
but this is probably a mistake based on the fact that the first word of the treatise is ἀρχά.  
9 Title in original Greek: Περὶ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας. 
10 Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica. 
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content.11 In order to do so, our analysis will provide excerpts of the text 
together with a running commentary. The purpose is to try to keep the 
discussion as continuous as possible, with an eye to a clear understanding of 
how the epistemological process takes place and what elements it involves, by 
providing some answers regarding the questions raised by the texts. For this 
reason, the analysis will focus more attentively on the division of the parts of 
knowledge and the description of the knowledge-process, touching on other 
issues addressed by the treatises by the way. 
We will aim to show that a general coherence can be detected across the 
whole of ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and Sense-Perception, with a focus on 
process and ontological division of knowledge and its faculties. We will see 
that ps-Archytas formulates an original epistemological theory out of pre-
existing materials he found in both Plato and Aristotle, and/or in the 
Academic and Peripatetic traditions that preceded his treatise; that this two-
world theory accommodates both pure intellection and sense-perception, 
which are seen as reciprocal and co-dependent vis-à-vis the truth within the 
overall epistemological process; that ps-Archytas develops an original and 
unparalleled theory of the criterion of being, which involves a complex 
criterial apparatus for knowledge-acquisition, involving a subject of 
judgment, and object of judgment, and a paradigm or standard by which to 
produce the judgment; that this critical apparatus serves to produce 
philosophical accounts in syllogistic structures involving both inference from 
particulars and deduction from universals; and that these syllogistic 
structures, which are diverse, are probative and ultimately corroborative. 
Additionally, we will see that ps-Archytas shows his ‘approval’ of Plato’s 
Divided Line (Resp., VI, 509d 6-511e 5), in a rhetorical bid to subsume 
Plato’s quadripartition of the segments of knowledge under his own 
quadripartition of the parts of knowledge. Finally, it will be argued that the 
lone surviving fragment of ps-Brontinus’ On Intellect and Discursive Thought 
functions to bridge the diverse theories of Plato and ps-Archytas on the issue 
of where διάνοια belongs and how it functions within the knowledge-process. 
1.2. Two Doxographical Reports on Hellenistic Pythagorean Epistemology 
It is helpful to take our start from a remarkable account of the 
second/third century CE Christian ‘Hippolytus’ (in all likelihood the 
                                                                          
11 Many of the contextualising passages we will discuss are mentioned in Ulacco’s 
commentary, but we sometimes arrive at different conclusions than she does. 
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heresiologist of Rome), who gives us a sense of the richness of the 
Hellenistic and/or post-Hellenistic Pythagorean system: 
There are, then, two worlds (κόσμοι) according to Pythagoras, one intelligible 
(νοητός), which has as its principle the monad, and one perceptible (αἰσθητός); [the 
principle] of the latter is the tetraktys, which has an iota, the “single horn”, a perfect 
number. And according to the Pythagoreans, the iota, the single horn, is the first and 
most authoritative substance of both the intelligibles <and the perceptibles>, when 
it is grasped (λαμβανομένη) intelligibly and perceptibly. There are nine classes of 
incorporeal accident, which cannot exist apart from substance: quality, quantity, 
relation, where, when, position, possession, action, and affection. Thus the [classes] 
accidental to substance are nine, which, when they are counted together with it [sc. 
substance], possess the perfect number, the iota. Hence, as we said, the universe is 
divided into an intelligible world and a perceptible world, and we too have our 
reason (λόγος) from the intelligible, in order that we might gaze upon (ἐποπτεύωμεν) 
the substance of the intelligible, incorporeal, divine things by reason (τῷ λόγῳ); but, 
he says, we have five sense-perceptions: smell, sight, hearing, taste, and touch, among 
which we arrive at understanding (γνῶσις) of perceptibles. And in this way, he says, is 
the perceptible [cosmos] divided from the intelligible cosmos. And we have the 
ability to realize the fact that we have an instrument of understanding (γνώσεως 
ὄργανον) for each of them. None of the intelligibles, he says, is able to be understood 
(γνωστόν) by us through sense-perception; for ‘neither eye has seen nor ear heard’ 
this, nor, he says, has any of the other sense-perceptions come to understand [it] 
(ἔγνω). Nor yet again is it possible for anyone to come to understanding (γνῶσις) of 
perceptibles by reason, but one must see (ἰδεῖν) that it is white, and taste (γεύσασθαι) 
that it is sweet, and know (εἰδέναι) that it is either tuneful or tuneless by hearing 
(ἀκούσαντας); [and telling] whether some smell is pleasant or unpleasant is a 
function (ἔργον) of the sense of smell, not reason. The situation is the same with 
touch: for it is not possible to know (εἰδέναι) hard, or soft, or hot, or cold, by 
listening, but touch is the judgment (κρίσις) of these sorts of things. (‘Hipp.’, 
Refutation of All Heresies, VI, 23-24 = p. 150, 15-151, 17 Wendland; trans. after 
Osborne) 
‘Hippolytus’ provides a comprehensive account of Pythagorean epistemology 
according to a familiar division of the parts of knowledge and their respective 
relationships to the parts of the universe. Pythagoras is thought to have 
identified two worlds (κόσμοι), which are represented by their respective 
principles: the intelligible world, which is governed by the monad, and the 
perceptible cosmos, which is governed by the tetraktys, an equilateral triangle 
whose sides are four units long whose units add up to ten. This is what 
‘Hippolytus’ calls ‘the iota’ and the ‘single horn’ . The ‘iota’ is equivalent to the 
number ten (or, as it is described elsewhere in the Pythagorean tradition, the 
‘Decad’ ), and hence it is reflected in the ten categories – one essential category 
of substance, and nine categories of accidents. Importantly, the division into 
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intelligible and perceptible worlds correlates to the parts of the mind, in a strict 
division: the intelligible, incorporeal, divine world, which relates to substance 
(the first category), can only be accessed through ‘reason’ (λόγος), whereas the 
perceptible world can only be accessed through the five sense-perceptive 
faculties. The former activity is described as ‘gazing’ (ἐποπτεύωμεν) and implies 
a sort of divine oversight12 or a mystical gaze, such as that of the charioteer 
who once again grasps the Forms in Plato’s Phaedrus (250c);13 the latter 
activity is described as ‘understanding’ (γνῶσις), with each of the five sense-
perceptive faculties acting as an ‘instrument’ (ἔργον) for its respective 
object of sensation. By virtue of acting as instruments, the sense-perceptive 
faculties perform judgments (scil. κρίσις) of their respective objects.14  
‘Hippolytus’’ account of Pythagorean epistemology here would appear 
at first glance to be an eclectic collection of materials that corresponds 
roughly to what one might expect of a Platonist expression of Pythagorean 
philosophy.15 There are telltale signs of Middle Platonist appropriation, 
including the appeal to the ten Aristotelian categories, a robust two-worlds 
commitment (involving a strict division of the intelligible and sensible 
worlds), and a bit of ‘Pythagorean’ symbology regarding the Decad and 
tetraktys thrown in.16 Now compare this Platonising account to another, 
                                                                          
12 Cf. Tim. Locr., p. 225, 6-7 Thesleff, where daemons are described as “overseers of 
human affairs” (ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων); similarly among the Stoics (SVF II 1102) and 
ps-Hippodamus (p. 97, 3-4 Thesleff). 
13 This is the language of the mysteries (and especially the Eleusinian Mysteries) 
appropriated to philosophy. For a general account of this in the Eleusinian Mysteries, see 
G. Petridou, Divine Epigraphy in Greek Literature and Culture, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2016, p. 85-86. 
14 Compare Anonymus Photii p. 238.21-239.2 Thesleff, where the author asserts that 
for Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, the five sense-perceptive faculties are each critical 
(κριτική) in their discernment of the qualities associated with each sense-perceptive faculty. 
15 Compare Theon of Smyrna 15.15-16, who claims that Plato calls ἐποπτεία “the 
treatment of intelligibles, the things that really exist, and what relates to the ideas” (on which, 
see F. M. Petrucci, Teone di Smirne. Expositio rerum mathematicarum ad legendum Platonem 
utilium, Introduzione, traduzione, commento, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2012, p. 
302-304, with bibliography). On this, see D. P. Taormina, “Platonismo e Pitagorismo” in R. 
Chiaradonna (ed.), Filosofia tardoantica, Roma, Carocci, 2012, p. 103-127. 
16 For good general accounts of Pythagorean metaphysics and epistemology in this 
period, see B. Centrone, “The pseudo-Pythagorean Writings”, in C. Huffman (ed.), A 
History of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 321-326 and 
Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 10-16. On the relationship between Middle 
Platonism, especially that found in Alexandria from the 1st century BCE-1st century CE, 
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preserved by pseudo-Plutarch, and belonging to the doxographical writings 
of Aëtius of (roughly) the 1st century CE: 
“And our soul”, he [sc. Pythagoras] says, “is composed out of the tetrad [sc. four]: for 
it is intellect (νοῦς), knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), opinion (δόξα), and perception 
(αἴσθησις)”, from which all art (τέχνη) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) [arise], and we 
ourselves are rational (λογικοί). Well then, the Monad (ἡ μονάς) [sc. unit/one] is the 
intellect; for the intellect contemplates in respect of unit (κατὰ μονάδα θεωρεῖ). For 
example, among many men who exist, some are unperceptible (ἀναίσθητοι), 
ungraspable (ἀπερίληπτοι), and infinite (ἄπειροι) in terms of parts (ἐπὶ μέρους), but 
we intellect that this Man-himself is one alone (αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπον ἕνα μόνον 
νοοῦμεν), to which none [of these men] happens to be similar; and we intellect that 
the Horse[-itself] is one, but there are infinite [horses] in terms of parts. For all these 
things are Forms and Kinds in respect of units (τὰ εἴδη καὶ γένη κατὰ μονάδας). 
Hence, in the case of every single one of these, they say that an animal is “rational” or 
“money-making”, giving this definition [to them]. It is by virtue of this, by which we 
intellect these things, that the unit is intellect. And the Indefinite Dyad (ἡ δυὰς ἡ 
ἀόριστος) [sc. two] is knowledge; rightly so, since every demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) and 
proof (πίστις) belongs to knowledge, and additionally every syllogism brings a 
conclusion to what is contested from certain agreed [premises] and readily proves 
something other [than the agreed premises].17 Therefore, knowledge is 
comprehension (κατάληψις), which is why it would be dyadic [sc. double]. And 
opinion, which [arises] out of comprehension, is a triad [sc. three]. Correctly so, 
because opinion is of many things. And the triad is multiple, e.g. “thrice-blessed 
Danaans”. And it is by virtue of this that it [sc. opinion] admits of the triad…18 (Aët., 
Plac., I, 3, 8 = Dox. 282-283)  
Translation and interpretation of this passage are challenging, in no small 
part because ps-Plutarch’s material likely constitutes an epitome of Aëtius’ 
original text. In comparison with ‘Hippolytus’’ account of Pythagorean 
epistemology, however, we note several divergences: there is no mention of 
the ten Aristotelian categories,19 nor yet any appeal to the mysticism 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha, see M. Bonazzi, “Eudorus of Alexandria and the 
‘Pythagorean’ pseudepigrapha”, in G. Cornelli-C. Macris-R. McKirahan (eds.), On 
Pythagoreanism, Berlin, de Gruyter, 2013. 
17 This seems to us to be the meaning of πᾶς συλλογισμὸς ἔκ τινων ὁμολογουμένων τὸ 
ἀμφισβητούμενον συνάγει καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποδείκνυται ἕτερον. 
18 One imagines that Aëtius would have also gone onto associate the tetrad with 
sense-perception (as noted by H. Diels (ed.), Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, Reimer, 1879, ad 
loc.), but that this has not survived the transmission. 
19 This is not to imply that ‘Hippolytus’ had no access to Hellenistic/post-
Hellenistic Pythagorean texts at all, since the Aristotelian ten categories appear in ps-
Archytas’ On the Universal Logos (e.g. p. 22, 6-31 Thesleff). But the order of categories 
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indicated by the tetraktys and the mysterious iota; and, more importantly, 
there is a division of epistemological capacities into four, not two, classes. 
Hence, Aëtius characterizes Pythagorean epistemology as a quadripartition 
constituted of intellect (νοῦς), knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), opinion (δόξα), and 
perception (αἴσθησις).20 What accounts for the diversity of Aëtius’ report, we 
would suggest, is a closeness to actual epistemological texts of ascribed to 
early Pythagoreans, but almost certainly written down sometimes between 
the 1st century BCE and the 1st century CE. As we will see, Aëtius’ 
description of Pythagorean epistemology is especially important because it 
would appear to be the first attempt at reception and interpretation of the 
central treatise on epistemology produced by these Pythagoreans on the 
threshold of the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic worlds: ps-Archytas’ On 
Intellect and Sense-Perception. 
2. Pseudo-Archytas’ On Intellect and Sense-Perception 
2.1. Preliminary Division of Beings: Some Puzzles 
We begin with the first fragment, which features a surprising ‘authorial’ 
signature, as the treatise announces itself to be the work of ‘Archytas’ 
(Archa tas): 
                                                                                                                                                                              
ascribed to Pythagoras by ‘Hippolytus’ (Ref., VI, 24) is different from that of ps-Archytas 
(especially in categories 5-10), suggesting that ‘Hippolytus’ did not have access to ps-
Archytas’ writings. Much closer to ps-Archytas’ categories that ascribed by Philo (Dec., 30-
31) to “those who spend time on the doctrines of philosophy” (οἱ ἐνδιατρίβοντες τοῖς τῆς 
φιλοσοφίας δόγμασιν).  
20 Contrast the octopartition of the “instruments of understanding” (γνώσεως ὀκτώ 
ὄργανα) associated with Pythagoreanism by Anonymus Photii (p. 240, 29-241, 5 Thesleff) 
into sense-perception (αἴσθησις), imagination (φαντασία), opinion (δόξα), art (τέχνη), 
intelligence (φρόνησις), knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), wisdom (σοφία), intellect (νοῦς): “Among 
these, what is shared between us and the divine is art, intelligence, knowledge, <wisdom>, 
and intellect, but what is shared between us and the irrational is sense-perception and 
imagination, and what is peculiar to us alone is opinion. Sense-perception is a false 
understanding through a body; imagination is motion in a soul…[lacuna]…art is a productive 
disposition with reason (and ‘with reason’ is added because a spider also produces, but it does 
so without reason); intelligence is a volitional disposition directed towards correctness in 
practical affairs; knowledge is a disposition <towards understanding> of the things that 
always remain the same and as such; wisdom is knowledge of the primary causes; and 
intellect is the principle and fount of all good things”. 
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The principle of (Ἀρχὰ τᾶς) the understanding21 of the things that are (τῶν ἐόντων 
γνώσις), [is] the things immediately manifest themselves (τὰ αὐτὰ αὐτόθεν22 
φαινόμενα). Indeed, of the things which are immediately manifest, some are intelligible 
(νοατά), whereas others are perceptible (αἰσθατά). And things which are unmoved are 
intelligible, whereas things that are moved are perceptible. The criterion (κριτήριον) of 
intelligible things is the intellect (νοός), whereas the [criterion] of the perceptible 
things [is] sense-perception (αἴσθασις). Among the things which are not immediately 
manifest, some are knowable (ἐπιστατά), whereas others are opinable (δοξαστά). 
Indeed, things which are unmoved are knowable, whereas things which are moved are 
opinable. (ps-Archytas, On Intellect and Sense-Perception, Fr. 1 p. 36, 14-19 Thesleff = 
Stob., Ecl., I, 41, 5, p. 282, 23-283, 2 Wachsmuth)  
The beginning of the text introduces us to the central topic of the treatise: 
the understanding (γνώσις) of the things that are (τὰ ἐόντα).23 The 
principle (ἀρχά)24 of the understanding of these existents is said to be 
things which are immediately manifest (τὰ αὐτὰ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενα).25 These 
things are described first with appeal to two verbal adjectives, which 
connote their understandability: some of them are νοατά, intelligible, while 
others αἰσθατά, perceptible. Next, the attention is shifted to a clarification 
of which objects are intelligible and which perceptible, and the further 
elucidation that follows differentiates them by their susceptibility to 
motion. Things which are moved, or subject to motion, are perceptible, 
                                                                          
21 As above, we translate γνῶσις and related terms with ‘understanding’ vel sim., 
although ‘apprehension’ is also a possibility. 
22 In post-Hellenistic philosophical Greek, this word when combined with words of 
perception tends to confer a meaning of ‘self-evident’, whether we are dealing with a 
Platonist (e.g. Plutarch., De fac., 930A) or a Stoic (Mus. Ruf., Diss. Luc. dig., I, 16; I, 18; I, 
24; 18A, 12). It does not recur anywhere else among the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha. 
23 Cf. ps-Archytas, On the Universal Logos, p. 32, 10-14 Thesleff, where we hear that 
“all knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), although it takes its beginning from limited things, is able to 
understand (γνωστική) infinities. The power it has is so great, even if it rationalizes 
through few things. But the knowledge of the things that are is even greater. For it is able 
to understand (γνωστική) infinitely the things that exist (τὰ ὄντα), and those that have 
been, and those that will be”.  
24 Throughout this article, we will retain the Doricisms of the text. 
25 Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 112, refers to these as ‘autoevident’. The 
terminology (αὐτόθεν, μὴ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενα) is not common in the Classical or Hellenistic 
periods, but it is associated by Sextus Empiricus with dogmatic philosophy. For his own 
part, Sextus (M, VIII, 28) considers autoevidence to be a core attribute of ‘pre-evident’ 
(πρόδηλα) things, which “immediately fall to the sense-perceptive [faculties] and thought” 
(τὰ αὐτόθεν ὑποπίπτοντα ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ). Cf. again Ulacco, 
Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 112. 
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while those which are not subject to motion are, on the contrary, 
intelligible. This is not to say that the apple which is sitting motionless on 
the table is an intelligible, but rather, that intelligibles are things not 
subject to motion, in an Aristotelian sense of motion (which can be 
characterized minimally by change in substance, quality, quantity or 
place).26 But, apparently, things which are immediately manifest are not the 
only objects populating this world. Indeed, ps-Archytas offers a description 
of things which are not immediately manifest as well, which, once again, is 
offered in terms of their knowability and expressed with verbal adjectives. 
Things which are not immediately manifest can be either knowable 
(ἐπιστατά), or opinable (δοξαστά). Moreover, the same clarification 
expressed before in relation to objects which could be intelligible or 
perceptible is offered here: things which are not subject to motion are 
knowable, while things which are subject to motion are opinable. In the 
first few lines of the text, ps-Archytas provides us with a sufficient 
description of the objects populating this world (τὰ ἐόντα), and explains 
how they can be known, in relation to their ontological capacity for 
motion/change, and according to their epistemic status as immediately 
manifest or not. As all kinds of objects are characterised by a gradual 
selection of verbal adjectives connoting their knowability, a comprehensive 
division of the objects in existence looks like this:27  
 
 
 Motion/Change Self-Manifestability Knowability 
 
    
  τὰ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενα Νοατά 
  τὰ ἀκίνητα   
  τὰ μὴ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενα ἐπιστάτα 
τὰ ἐόντα    
  τὰ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενα αἰσθατά 
  τὰ κινεόμενα   
  τὰ μὴ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενα Δοξαστά 
 
 
After having presented a classification of beings in terms of their 
manifestability and motion, though, curiously enough Archytas leaves aside 
                                                                          
26 Aristot., Phys., III, 1, 200b 33-34. 
27 The diagram does not aim to represent an ontological scala naturae, but instead to 
summarise Archytas’ epistemological divisions. An analogous scheme is provided by 
Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 111. The reason for our new scheme is to be 
explained by our focus on ps-Archytas’ epistemology (rather than his ontology).  
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things which are not immediately (μὴ αὐτόθεν) manifest and concentrates 
only on those which are (αὐτόθεν). Indeed, a criterion is introduced only 
for the latter: the criterion of intelligible things28 is the intellect, and that of 
perceptible things is sense-perception; there is no mention of a criterion for 
knowable or opinable things.29 It is not immediately clear what specific 
connotation the word κριτήριον has.30 Indeed, although having cognitive 
faculties indicated as criteria vel sim. is generally in line with standard 
Hellenistic conceptualizations of the epistemological theories of Plato, 
Aristotle and Epicurus, at least in most places,31 it is not directly obvious 
why, for ps-Archytas, things which are not immediately (μὴ αὐτόθεν) 
manifest are not assigned respective criteria as well. For, even though they 
are not immediately manifest, none of them is described as impossible to 
                                                                          
28 Note here that ps-Archytas switches to the plural to refer to intelligible things. It 
must be underlined that the decision to employ a neuter singular or a neuter plural is 
significant throughout. The same can be said for the use of the article, which highlights 
when the focus of the discussion is the epistemological status of the objects, rather than 
their ontological connotation.  
29 Note that ps-Archytas avoids collapsing the four species into two. Contrast with 
Alcinous (Didask., 4, p. 154, 10-34 = 13A Boys-Stones, part; transl. Boys-Stones), who 
claims of λόγος that it “is also a judge (κριτής), through which the truth is judged 
(κρίνεται). And reason is twofold: there is one sort which is completely firm and 
unshakeable, and other which is reliable in its grasp of things (κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων 
γνῶσιν). Of these, the former is possible for god but impossible for man; the second is 
possible for man as well. And this too [i.e. the second kind of reason] is double: there is 
reason concerned with intelligible objects (περὶ τά νοητά) and reason concerned with 
perceptible objects (περὶ τὰ αἰσθητά). Of these, the one concerned with intelligibles is 
‘knowledge’ (ἐπιστήμη) or ‘epistemic reason’; the one concerned with perceptibles is 
‘opinionative reason’ or ‘opinion’ (δόξα). So epistemic reason is secure and permanent, 
since it is concerned with secure and permanent objects but persuasive, ‘opinionative’ 
reason contains a great deal of [mere] likelihood because its objects are not permanent. 
The principles of knowledge (ἀρχαὶ ἐπιστήμης), i.e. knowledge regarding intelligibles, and 
of opinion, i.e. opinion regarding perceptibles, are intellection and perception (νόησίς τε 
καὶ αἴσθησις)”. 
30 It is not the same function as Archytas’ notion of calculation (λογισμός) as the 
“standard and hindrance” (κανὼν καὶ κωλυτήρ), which prevents unjust people from 
committing injustices (Fr. 3 Huffman). See C. A. Huffman, Archytas of Tarentum: 
Pythagorean, Philosopher and Mathematician King, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, p. 218-223.  
31 As Ulacco (Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 112-116) underlines. See also G. Striker, 
“Kριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας”, in Ead. (ed.), Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 22-76. 
 
Giulia De Cesaris-Phillip Sidney Horky 
 232 
understand. If we might doubt that a definitive class of things which are 
δοξαστά exists in any full sense, the same cannot be said of things which are 
ἐπιστάτα, at least if we take the term itself as indicating those things that 
are the objects of a science. Moreover, things to which a criterion is 
assigned are described, at the beginning, as immediately manifest. While it 
is not difficult to understand how something can be immediately manifest 
to our senses, it is more challenging to figure out how intelligible things can 
be described as immediately manifest, or autoevident.  
Accordingly, how should we understand their autoevidentiary quality? 
The text implies that things which are immediately manifest are so in 
relation to specific cognitive faculties – intelligible objects to the intellect on 
the one hand, and perceptible objects to sense-perception on the other 
hand. At the moment, the text leaves aside the question of those things 
that are not immediately manifest – it will return to the issue later on, on p. 
38, 14 Thesleff. In any case, the first section of the text, although quite 
clear and systematic at first glance, reveals itself to be puzzling for the 
following reasons:  
a. Although the principle/beginning of the understanding of the 
things that are is described as those things which are immediately manifest 
themselves, things which are not immediately manifest would also appear 
to be nonetheless understandable (in a stronger sense (ἐπιστάτα) when they 
are not subject to motion, and in a weaker sense (δοξαστά) if they are). 
b. Some things which are not immediately manifest, although not 
associated with a criterion, are nonetheless said to be knowable (ἐπιστάτα). 
Accordingly, we might wonder whether they are knowable by virtue of 
some other faculty that is non-discriminatory? Or has ps-Archytas 
deliberately ignored the issue of how certain knowable objects can be 
understood without judgments? 
c. Things which are immediately manifest are so in relation to their 
appropriate cognitive faculties which act as their respective criteria 
(intellect for intelligible things, sense-perception for perceptible things). 
But once again it is not clear what the intellective and sense-perceptive 
faculties are assessing precisely, nor yet of how they are expected to act as 
judges for their objects.  
In order to try to find some answers to these questions, let us take a 
look at what follows. 
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2.2. Ps-Archytas on the Criterion 
In the next portion of On Intellect and Sense-Perception, ps-Archytas 
specifies in what sense the two cognitive faculties whose objects are 
immediately manifest act as ‘judges’ of their respective objects:  
It is necessary to consider (νοᾶσαι) these three things: what judges (τὸ κρῖνον), what is 
judged (τὸ κρινόμενον), and that by virtue of which32 there is a judgement (ποθ’ ὅπερ 
κρίνεται). [It is necessary to consider] too that what judges is the intellect and sense-
perception; what is judged is the account (λόγος); and that by virtue of which there is 
a judgement is what is immediately manifest (τὸ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενον). Of this [sc. 
what is immediately manifest], one [species] is intelligible, and the other is 
perceptible. The intellect determines (ἐπικρίνει) the account, sometimes by applying 
[it] to the intelligible, and sometimes to the perceptible. For, indeed, whenever the 
account (λόγος) is sought with regard to intelligible things, it applies to the 
intelligible, whereas whenever [it is sought] with regard to perceptible things, it 
applies to the perceptible. (ps-Archytas, On Intellect and Sense-Perception, Fr. 1 p. 36, 
19-25 Thesleff = Stob., Ecl., I, 41, 5, p. 283, 2-10 Wachsmuth) 
This section helps us to understand the epistemological process and the 
role intellect and sense-perception play as criteria of their respective 
objects. Indeed, we are told that the process of understanding existents 
involves three elements: that which judges, i.e. intellect and sense-
perception; that which is judged, i.e. the λόγος (which we translate with 
‘account’); and that in relation to, or by virtue of which (ποθ’ ὅπερ) there is 
a judgement, i.e. the thing which is immediately manifest. Hence, we gain 
some clarification here: it is not, as we might have originally thought, the 
immediately manifest object that is judged; rather, it is the λόγος that is 
judged in relation to the immediately manifest object. 
We learn how two cognitive faculties, intellect and sense-perception, 
function as criteria: each ‘judges’ a λόγος as appropriate to the immediately 
manifest object of its understanding. Objects that are not immediately 
manifest, i.e. knowable and opinable objects, are not liable to judgment – 
an interesting aspect of ps-Archytas’ epistemological theory that can be 
explained, as we will see later on, by the fact that they are ends, and not 
principles, of knowledge. In the initial lines, it seemed that both intellect 
and sense-perception play parallel roles in the procedure of understanding 
the things that are; there is no concern with scepticism about, for example, 
sense-perceptive judgments that arise and their role in contributing to 
                                                                          
32 Or: “relative to which”. 
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knowledge.33 In the lines that follow, intellect is assigned a more specific 
task: to make a determination (ἐπικρίνει) of the λόγος, sometimes by 
applying it to the intelligible, and sometimes by applying it to the 
perceptible. We should not forget that ps-Archytas had differentiated the 
domains of intellection of sense-perception. Indeed, intellect was said to be 
the criterion for things which are intelligible, while sense-perception for 
those which are perceptible. This is important because although the 
process here described might be thought to be unified, by which we mean it 
might be assumed to involve both faculties at one and the same time, it is 
more likely that ps-Archytas is providing a description of two different 
cognitive processes: on the one hand, the assessment of λόγοι about things 
which are intelligible, whose criterion is the intellect; on the other hand, 
the assessment of λόγοι about things which are perceptible, and whose 
criterion is sense-perception. If this is right, it means that the content of 
sense-perception is also characterised as somehow propositional, since it is 
the task of sense-perception as well to determine an account in relation to a 
thing that needs to be articulated according to the process of 
understanding. The further clarification, that “whenever the account is 
sought with regard to intelligible things, it applies to the intelligible, 
whereas whenever [it is sought] with regard to perceptible things, it applies 
to the perceptible”, indicates that (at least) two different types of λόγος are 
determined, in relation to their peculiar objects. But ps-Archytas 
acknowledges the intellect alone as that which determines the account. 
What does this imply?  
Two difficulties arise in regard to this asymmetry. The first is related 
to the assessment of perceptible objects. Why is it the responsibility of the 
intellect, and not of the sense-perceptive faculty, to determine the account 
in relation to perceptibles? One possibility might be that the information 
provided by sense-perception is confused and not yet propositionally 
                                                                          
33 Compare with Ptolemy’s On the Kriterion and Hegemonikon, 10, 1-6, where sense-
perception conveys truth about the affections it undergoes (i.e. sense-perceptions are 
true), but it sometimes makes a false report about the cause of this fact (τὸ διαθὲν δ’ὅτι 
τοιοῦτον, ἑνίοτε ψεύδεται). See M. Schiefsky, “The Epistemology of Ptolemy’s On The 
Criterion”, in M.-K. Lee, Strategies of Argument: Essays in Ancient Ethics, Epistemology, 
and Logic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 320. In particular, perceptual 
faculties never err with respect to their proper objects (i.e. Aristotelian special sensibles). 
See J. Feke, Ptolemy’s Philosophy: Mathematics as a Way of Life, Princeton-Oxford, 
Princeton University Press, 2018, p. 21-22. 
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organised. If this is the case, it would be responsibility of the intellect to 
organise its content into an account (λόγος) and thereby ‘determine’ it, so 
to speak; but it would still be up to sense-perception to judge whether the 
account really applies to the thing perceived. Yet a similar difficulty arises 
in relation to intelligible objects. Indeed, if it is the intellect which 
determines (ἐπικρίνει) the account, how can it be the same intellect which 
judges it (τὸ κρῖνον)? So understood, the passage might imply a certain 
circularity in the process of understanding. A possible answer to this 
difficulty might be found if we infer that there is a real difference between 
the activities implied by the two verbs ἐπικρίνω and κρίνω and understand 
the verb ἐπικρίνω as describing a sort of selection of the appropriateness of 
the account, performed by the intellect.34 In this case, the intellect’s 
responsibility would involve making sure the account is fitting for the objects 
it relates to. Or, to put it more schematically:  
1. Intellect and sense-perception are understood to be criteria for, 
respectively, the account that deals with intelligibles, and the account that 
deals with perceptibles. Hence, the account itself has at least two different 
and possible articulations, depending on the immediately manifest objects it 
expresses something about. This means that the account itself should be 
appropriate either to the intelligible or to the perceptible in some way; 
otherwise the latter specification could be superfluous. 
2. Moreover, if it is the intellect which determines (ἐπικρίνει) the 
account that relates to intelligibles, it is unclear what it means to say that it 
judges (τὸ κρῖνον) it too. Might this process involve some circularity? Doubts 
arise, too, regarding the intellect’s relationship to sense-perception. If this, 
too, has the task of judging an account that deals with perceptibles, how does 
it exercise its (peculiar) function? 
3. Finally, there seems to be an implicit comparison being assumed in 
the comparison of λόγοι that are judged for the immediately manifest 
                                                                          
34 See Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 119-120, where she briefly discusses the 
use of this verb in Plato, Aristotle, and Arius Didymus’ account of Peripatetic 
epistemology. The last witness is the most interesting: he claims of Aristotle that “the 
criteria of the knowledge of these things – of intelligibles and perceptibles – are the 
intellect and sense-perception, respectively. For neither could sense-perception determine 
(ἐπικρίνειν) the universal, nor intellect the particular”. On this passage and its relevance for 
understanding Theophrastus’ theory of the criterion, see P. Huby, “Theophrastus and the 
Criterion”, in P. Huby-G. Neal (eds.), The Criterion of Truth, Liverpool, Liverpool 
University Press, 1989, p. 108-110. 
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intelligibles (by the intellect) and the λόγοι that are judged for the 
immediately manifest perceptibles (by the sense-perceptive faculty). What 
are the content and form of these λόγοι?  
2.3. The Process of Knowledge-Acquisition 
These puzzles are at least partially resolved in the section that follows, 
where ps-Archytas provides some examples to supplement what he has 
previously left not fully explained, and deals directly with the specific task 
of each of the elements involved in the process of knowledge: 
And hence, artificial diagrams (ψευδογραφίαι) in geometry are made manifest 
according to figures and numbers; while in physics, and in politics, accounts of cause 
(αἰτιολογίαι) and of likelihood (εἰκοτολογίαι)35 [are made manifest] according to 
generation and [political] affairs (κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ πράξιας), respectively. For, indeed, 
reason (λόγος), when it applies to the intelligible, recognizes the fact that harmony 
happens in a double account (ἐν διπλόῳ λόγῳ). But [reason] confirms the fact that 
the double account is concordant (συμφωνεῖ) through perception. And concerning 
the objects of mechanics, accounts apply to intelligibles by reference to figures and 
numbers and proportions, whereas finished products apply to perceptible things. For 
these things are studied with matter and motion. And in general, it is impossible [for 
us] to understand the “why” (τὸ διὰ τι) in each thing if we do not already know 
(προειδότας) each thing, “what it is” (τί ἐστιν). Each of the things that are, “what it 
is”, is judged by the intellect; while “the fact that it exists” (ὅτι ἐστίν) or “that it is in 
in this way” (ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει) by reason (λόγῳ) and sense-perception (αἰσθάσει): by 
reason, whenever we indicate through a syllogism the proof (δεῖξίν σαμάνωμεν διὰ 
συλλογισμῶ) for something which subsists by necessity (τινος...ὑπάρχοντος ἐξ 
ἀνάγκας); by sense-perception, whenever we confirm (ἐπιμαρτυρώμεθα) the account 
(λόγος) through sense-perception. (ps-Archytas, On Intellect and Sense-Perception, 
Fr. 1, p. 36, 25-37, 12 Thesleff = Stob., Ecl., I, 41, 5, p. 283, 10-284, 2 Wachsmuth)  
This report requires quite a lot of unpacking, and some speculation about 
how we are to supply the missing premises; and yet, when we take it 
together with the elements gathered from the other portions of the text, it 
would appear to provide us with enough material to reconstruct each step 
of the process of knowledge-acquisition, in relation both to immediately 
manifest intelligibles (τὰ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενα νοατά) and immediately 
                                                                          
35 It is possible that the term εἰκοτολογία belongs originally to Theophrastus (see 
Procl., In Plat. Tim., II, 120, 29-121, 7 Diehl = 159 FHS&G), although its use by 
Theophrastus would appear to refer to meteorology, and not to politics, as is the case with 
ps-Archytas. 
Hellenistic Pythagorean Epistemology 
 237 
manifest perceptibles (τὰ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενα αἰσθατά).36 The process is 
easiest to grasp in relation to the perceptibles, and hence our analysis will 
firstly describe the process of αἴσθασις, and secondly that of νοός.  
Step 1: The first step of the process involves sense-perception and the 
acquisition of data. By way of the sense organs, sense-perception obtains 
the material related to the immediately manifest thing under examination. 
As we have seen, the data obtained seems to consist of a propositional 
content about the fact, expressed with a predicative content37 which 
describes the τὸ ὅτι ἐστιν “the fact that it exists”, or the ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, “the 
fact that it is in this way” of the manifest object (φαινόμενον). For example, 
the data sense-perception is said to ‘judge’ (κρίνεται) could be constituted 
of a predicative statement of the kind, “this coffee is hot”. It is important 
here to note that, at this stage, sense-perception deals exclusively with 
individuals. Indeed, what is always involved in this step of the process is the 
acquisition of data related to an immediate and individual object, and not a 
complex set of propositions, each of which involves universal predications.  
Step 2: Once the data has been attained, it is time for the intellect (νοός) to 
play its role. Indeed, the νοός undertakes a primary sortition of the material 
received38 by determining (ἐπικρίνει) the account (λόγος) appropriate to the 
object (whether intelligible or perceptible). It seems plausible, that, at this 
stage, multi-step reasoning is involved, most likely of a syllogistic kind. To 
develop the example provided for step 1, νοός would here articulate the 
information provided by sense perception in the following way: 
a) This coffee is hot. 
b) Hot things burn. 
c) This coffee burns. 
                                                                          
36 It is not obvious that ps-Archytas is ready to describe non-immediately manifest 
objects at this stage. 
37 Our main intention here is to differentiate the content obtained here from 
something like an image, which might not feature propositional content. It is interesting 
here, that, in a very recent article, Corcilius also characterises the content of the World-
Soul’s cognition of the sensibles as propositional (note that Corcilius also underscores that 
Plato “does not endow the world soul with sense-perception”), K. Corcilius, “Ideal 
Intellectual Cognition in Tim. 37a2-c5”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 54 (1), 
2018, p. 51-105.  
38 See lines 22-23.  
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It must be noted, here, that contrary to what we saw above for sense-
perception, the intellect can make universal statements (e.g. ‘hot things 
burn’) and draw inferences from them. If this is right, sense-perception 
would be required only for the initial acquisition of data related to the 
individual, but its data would not be necessary for further steps in the 
production of knowledge: one understanding alone would be enough for 
the intellect to draw universal inferences and produce new knowledge. 
Hence, we are now provided with an account (λόγος) of an immediately 
manifest sensible, in the form of a syllogism.  
Step 3: In the last step of the process of knowledge-acquisition, sense-
perception is now required to test the results obtained by approving of the 
arrangement of the account determined by the νοός. To follow on the same 
example, sense-perception now needs to verify whether the coffee really 
burns, and if this corresponds to the object just perceived. If, for example, it 
is the case that the (previously hot) coffee goes cold,39 this would 
necessitate a new beginning of the process. Indeed, the data provided by 
sense-perception would offer a new and different content, which would 
similarly require a new determination of the account by the intellect. One 
important consequence of this last step is that sense-perception would 
appear to be infallible. Indeed, it is interesting to note how the verb 
ἐπιμαρτύρομαι evidences a validation of the λόγος that has been advanced by 
the intellect.40 Accordingly, this would imply that mistakes are directly 
                                                                          
39 We do not want to imply a chronological interpretation of the process, but just to 
account for the possibility that sense-perceptions may be subject to change, as, for 
example, in the case one sees something from a distance, and then ‘corrects’ what sight has 
seen at first, once we get closer to the object.  
40 The term ἐπιμαρτύρομαι is employed by Epicurus to refer to the confirmation of 
the truth of sense-perceptions (cf. Epicur., Hrdt., 50-51 and Sext. Emp., M, VII, 203-216 
= 247 Usener). On this usage, see the comments of F. Verde in Epicuro, Epistola a 
Erodoto, Introd. di E. Spinelli, trad. e comm. di F. Verde, Roma, Carocci, 2010, p. 136-
137. For Ptolemy, by contrast, sense-perception is like a messenger whose report is not 
always accurate, which is one reason why it needs intellect as a counterpart. Cf. Schiefsky, 
“Epistemology of Ptolemy”, p. 320-322. This may be related to the double use of φαντασία 
in Ptolemy’s On the Kriterion and Hegemonikon, which has a “dual technical meaning for 
Ptolemy: (1) a sense impression, and (2) the transmission of sense impression(s) to the 
intellect” (Feke, Ptolemy, p. 63-64). 
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attributable to our capacity for (syllogistic) reasoning, and not to our sense-
perceptive faculties or their activities.41  
 
Such would appear to be ps-Archytas’ approach to the generation of 
accounts that start from individuals and say something about how we grasp 
immediately perceptible objects. However, it is important to recall that ps-
Archytas is attempting to describe not one, but two types of account: the 
latter type, which comprises accounts that deal with immediate 
intelligibles, is more difficult to reconstruct from the text as it stands. But 
there are some suggestions. The description appears to assume a certain 
kind of parallel process, when grasping immediate intelligibles, to that 
involved in the understanding of immediate perceptibles: the intellect 
judges immediate intelligibles, whereas the sense-perceptive faculty judges 
immediate perceptibles. At some point, however, the rational capacity that 
focuses on these intelligibles (νοός) would appear to shift, or transition, 
into an activity that engages in some way with the perceptibles, and we 
think this shift is indicated by another change in terminology, from νοός to 
λόγος. Similar associations can be noted, for example, in the writings of 
Philo of Alexandria, whose epistemology is worth comparing to ps-
Archytas’ throughout.42 The shift would occur when the rational capacity 
ceases to study immediate intelligibles themselves and begins to situate the 
immediate intelligibles within a broader syllogistic process. To be wholly 
anachronistic (but perhaps the metaphor helps to make sense of what ps-
Archytas is saying), νοός ‘descends’ to the perceptibles and places the 
immediate intelligibles in a syllogistic framework;43 and when it does this, 
νοός becomes, or at least takes on the role of, λόγος as ‘rationality’.44  
                                                                          
41 Here it is useful to compare with Sextus Empiricus’ account of Peripatetic 
epistemology (M, VII, 226 = 14H Sharples, trans. after Sharples): “It appears from what 
has been said that the primary criteria for the knowledge of things are sense-perception 
and intellect (πρῶτα κριτήρια τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων γνώσεως ἥ τε αἴσθησις καὶ ὁ νοῦς), the 
former having the role of an instrument and the latter [that of] a craftsman. For as we 
cannot differentiate between straight and crooked things without a rule, so intellect is not 
naturally able to judge things without sense-perception”. 
42 Cf. Philo, Her., 183-185 and 234-236, where λόγος is the means through which 
νοῦς and αἴσθησις interact (although Philo imagines that divine λόγος intercedes from the 
outside). 
43 In interpreting ps-Archytas’ Divided Line (see below), Iamblichus, who probably 
knew this portion of On Intellect and Sense-Perception (although he does not quote it 
directly), says that “the λόγος, which occupies the mean between the two extreme points – 
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Now, in the case of accounts that proceed from an immediate sensible, 
the νοός would appear to intercede when it supplies the universal premise 
“hot things burn” in Step 2; and this makes sense, since ps-Archytas is clear 
that νοός deals with the “what it is” (τί ἐστιν), or definitions, of the things 
that are. But in the case of accounts that proceed from an immediate 
intelligible, we are told that their judgment is undertaken by reason (λόγος), 
“whenever we provide through syllogism the proof for something which 
subsists by necessity”. Hence, we tentatively reconstruct the process that 
involves immediate intelligibles in this way: 
Step 1*: The first step would consist in the intellect acquiring its own data. 
This time, though, the νοός directs itself towards νοατά, rather than 
perceptibles. What are these immediate intelligibles? Ps-Archytas tells us 
that what the intellect judges is the “τί ἐστιν”, the “what it is”, or, better, the 
definition of each of the things that are.45 By drawing a parallel with what 
we saw above with sense perception, we can plausibly presume that the 
starting point for the proof involving intelligibles is indeed the definition 
of a thing.  
Step 2*: Once the definition has been advanced, the second step involves a 
syllogistic type of reasoning (λόγος), which supplies a proof for things 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the intelligibles and the perceptibles – touches both, since it is established in an order of 
completion relative to the intellect and sense-perception (as these are its first principles) 
and brought to completion by them” (Comm. Math., 8, p. 38, 2-6 Festa-Klein).  
44 It is important to note that λόγος is expressly not given as the instrument employed 
by νοός to acquire knowledge, as perhaps one might expect. To be sure, our account is 
obviously problematic if νοός is supposed to be, like its objects, not susceptible to 
alteration. And our interpretation, which implies that νοός is potentially λόγος, but need 
not become λόγος, features its own problems too (especially since it is not expressly stated 
in the text this way). To be fair to our proposed interpretation here, such a problem is at 
the heart of the epistemology of the two figures who exercised the greatest influence over 
ps-Archytas, Plato and Aristotle, and scholars continue to argue about how the intellect is 
supposed to retain its identity while being similarly respondent to sense-perception. 
45 It is possible that ps-Archytas is referring to the essence, rather than the definition, 
of a thing. But since ps-Archytas would appear to be concerned with situating the τί ἐστιν 
as a statement that functions within a syllogistic framework, his notion here probably 
conforms to Aristotle’s distinction between a definition and an essence at Topics, I, 5, 102a 
4-5: “a definition is a statement which signifies the essence (ἔστι δ’ ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν 
εἶναι σημαίνων). It is asserted either as a statement in place of a term (ἀποδίδοται δὲ ἢ λόγος 
ἀντ’ ὀνόματος), or a statement in place of a statement (λόγος ἀντὶ λόγου)”.  
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which subsist by necessity.46 While in the case of sense-perception, the 
premise was directly related to a particular perceptible object, in this 
circumstance all the steps of the syllogistic reasoning involve universals. 
‘Rationality’ or ‘reason’ (λόγος) is here stated to supply a proof for 
something that subsists by necessity, which makes it possible for us to 
obtain the ‘why’ (τὸ διά τι).47 To give an example that would seem to 
comply with ps-Archytas’ description of a proof involving intelligibles: 
a) All men are animals. 
b) All animals are mortal. 
c) All men are mortal.  
Step 3*: The final step, would, once again, involve the intellect (νόος), 
which is expected to judge on the validity of the inferences drawn that lead 
to a new operating definition that is of wider universality.  
One last thing remains to be explained. Ps-Archytas tells us that “reason 
(λόγος), when it applies to the intelligible, recognizes the fact that harmony 
happens in a double account (ἐν διπλόῳ λόγῳ)”. But reason also “confirms the 
fact that the double account is concordant (συμφωνεῖ) through perception”. 
What, exactly, is this double account? And how are we to make sense of it? In 
                                                                          
46 An interesting parallel can be found in Aristotle’s account of Socrates’ method at 
Aristot., Metaph., XIII, 4, 1078b 24-29. In that context, Aristotle acknowledges to 
Socrates with his own conception of science conceived as demonstrative syllogisms based 
on definitions (see E. Berti, “Socrate e la la scienza dei contrari secondo Aristotele”, 
Elenchos, 29 (2) 2008, p. 303-315). Indeed, Socrates there is said to ἐζήτει τὸ τί ἐστιν. 
συλλογίζεσθαι γὰρ ἐζήτει, ἀρχὴ δὲ τῶν συλλογισμῶν τὸ τί ἐστιν; “and he naturally inquired 
into the essence of things; for he was trying to reason logically, and the starting-point of all 
logical reason is the essence” (transl. Tredennick).  
47 Compare with Aristot., APo, I, 13, 78b 34-79a 8: “The reason why (τὸ διότι) is 
superior to the fact (διαφέρει τοῦ ὅτι) in another way, in that each is studied by means of a 
different science. Such is the case with things that are related to one another in such a way 
that one is subordinate to the other, e.g. optics to geometry, mechanics to stereometry, 
harmonics to arithmetic, and star-gazing to astronomy […]. In these cases it is for those 
who concern themselves with perception to have knowledge of the facts (τὸ ὅτι εἰδέναι), 
whereas it is for the mathematicians to have knowledge of the reason why (τὸ δὲ διότι 
εἰδέναι). For the latter grasp demonstrations of the causes (τῶν αἰτίων τὰς ἀποδείξεις), and 
they often do not know the facts [τὸ ὅτι], just as people who study the universal often do 
not know some of the particular instances for lack of observing them” (transl. P. S. Horky, 
Plato and Pythagoreanism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 17). 
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order to gain clarification on this aspect of the process of knowledge-
acquisition, it may be helpful to appeal to a visual representation: 
 
 
 
 
 
STEP 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
STEP 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEP 3.  
 
 
αἴσθασις 
 
obtains through an act of 
judgment the data from sense 
organs (τὸ ὅτι ἐστιν/τὸ οὕτως 
ἔχει). 
νοός 
 
obtains through an act of 
judgment the definition (τί 
ἐστιν). 
νοὸς ἐπικρίνει τὸν λόγον 
The intellect determines the appropriate 
account… 
ποτιβάλλων ποτὶ τὸ 
αἰσθατόν 
(sometimes) by 
applying it to the 
sensible. 
ποτιβάλλων ποτὶ τὸ νοατόν 
(sometimes) by applying it to the 
intelligible. 
Perceptible account (λόγος 
[αἰσθητικός]) 
- Homogeneous with 
perceptible objects 
- Deals with universals 
and particulars 
- Provides further 
information about the 
individual under 
investigation  
Intelligible account (λόγος [νοητικός]) 
- Homogeneous with intelligible objects 
- Deals with universals 
- Offers a proof of something which 
subsists by necessity 
- Starts from and arrives at definitions (τί 
ἐστιν). 
- Is properly explanatory, i.e. provides the 
‘why’ (τὸ δία τι) 
 
αἴσθασις tests the soundness 
of the account 
 
νοός tests the validity of the 
account 
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Up to this point, we have been dealing with two different kinds of account, 
each homogeneous with those peculiar objects it deals with. But let us take 
a closer look at Step 2, and at the examples we provided before:  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
While the account related to intelligible objects (λόγος νοητικός) deals 
exclusively with universals, the account related to perceptible objects (λόγος 
αἰσθητικός) deals with both universals and particulars. Indeed, in order to 
perform an inference when studying a perceptible object, and, so to say, to 
pass from premise a) to the conclusion c), we must supply a universal 
premise, such as “hot things burn”. On the one hand, this accounts for the 
need of only one premise related to individual objects for inferential 
reasoning to be activated; on the other hand, this also tells us that in order 
for us to provide an account (λόγος) of something which is perceptible, the 
νοός must itself also be activated, so that we can obtain a meaningful 
understanding of the perceptible object in question. Hence, in both the 
cases of the intelligible and the perceptible accounts, which, when taken 
together, are assumed to exhaust the study of all objects in existence (τὰ 
ἐόντα), νοός is required in order for us to make any epistemic claim 
whatsoever (whether dealing with αἰσθατά or νοατά). In the first case, 
sense-perception needs to test whether the final λόγος still corresponds of 
the object we are perceiving, and to attest (ἐπιμαρτύρομαι) that this is the 
case; but in the case of intelligible objects, where an account is sought with 
reference to something which subsists by necessity (e.g. axiomatic or 
mathematical proofs), it will be reason (λόγος) that validates the 
knowledge-acquisition by appeal to specific types of demonstrations.48  
                                                                          
48 Compare here, with M. Bonazzi, “La teoria della conoscenza nel 
medioplatonismo”, Rivista di storia della filosofia, 80 (2), 2015, p. 348-350, the account of 
the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus, II, 11-III, 28 Bastianini-Sedley (13B 
Boys-Stones; transl. Boys-Stones): “Some Platonists thought that the dialogue [sc. 
Theaetetus] is about the criterion, since it is rich in investigation of this. This is not right. 
Rather, it is about simple and incomposite knowledge (περὶ ἐπιστήμης...ἁ[πλ]ῆς καὶ 
 
λόγος in relation to αἰσθατά 
 
a) This coffee is hot. 
b) Hot things burn. 
c) This coffee burns. 
 
λόγος in relation to νοατά 
 
a) All men are animals. 
b) All animals are mortal. 
c) All men are mortal.  
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Given this description of the process of knowledge-acquisition, we can 
now also test the examples provided. Indeed, they confirm our suppositions 
about the double applicability of the account (λόγος): in geometry, just as 
in physics and in politics, the account presented should always be 
appropriate to the objects it applies to. For this reason, λόγοι that address 
objects of geometry will become clear according to shapes and numbers, in 
coherence with the domain they express something about: that is to say, 
they will obtain in diagrams. Something similar happens for λόγοι that deal 
with the study of nature and with politics: their manifestation will be 
expressed in, respectively, natural growth and development, and political 
actions – as appropriate to the world of nature and of politics. Moreover, 
even the selection of the domains is significant. If we compare the domains 
with the different degrees of γνῶσις presented at the beginning of the text, 
we can reasonably relate geometrical λόγοι to objects which are ἐπιστατά, 
accounts of cause in nature to objects which are αἰσθατά, and accounts of 
likelihood in politics to those which are δοξαστά. Indeed, if this 
identification of the domains is right, geometrical objects belong to the 
class of ἐπιστατά, which were described as not immediately manifest. One 
explanation for this would be that in order to represent (or to provide a 
λόγος of) geometrical objects, one needs to construct diagrams, like Socrates 
and Meno’s slave constructing49 the square (Meno, 82b-84a): prior to 
drawing the square, it does not as such exist to sense-perception; but once 
it has been drawn, it is complete and therefore not liable to change or 
                                                                                                                                                                              
ἀσ[υ]νθέτου): for this purpose it has to look into the question of the criterion. By ‘criterion’ I 
mean that through which we judge, as a tool (τὸ [δ]ι’ οὗ κρίνομεν, ὡς ὀρ[γ]άνου). For we need 
something by which to judge things: then, as long as this is accurate, the steadfast acceptance 
of well-made judgments gives us knowledge…Knowledge is right reason bound “by an 
explanation of the reasoning” [Men. 98a] – for we know things when we know what they 
are, but also why they are (ὅταν μὴ μόνον εἰδῶμεν ὅτι ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ δία τί). But there were 
those who valued the senses highly because they possess something striking, attributing 
accuracy to them as well. Because of this, he [sc. Plato] is first going to put their supposition 
to the test; then he will pass on to (μεταβήσεται) right opinion, and after this to right opinion 
with reason (ἐπὶ δόξαν ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου). Then he will cease the investigation – for he would 
only need to add the bond of explanation for his account of this kind of knowledge to be 
complete”.  
49 It would appear that Socrates draws it, because he describes his act with ἐπιδείξωμαι 
(Men., 82b 2); similarly, when he pursues the demonstration, he adds diagonals with 
ἀναγραψώμεθα (ibid., 83b 1). 
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alteration (ἀκίνητον).50 By contrast, both the objects of nature and civic 
affairs would belong to that class of objects which are liable to change or 
alteration (τὰ κινεόμενα); but while objects of nature are αἰσθατά because 
they are immediately manifest to the cognitive faculty to which they belong 
(i.e. sense-perception), political affairs would correspond to those objects 
which are not immediately manifest to our cognitive faculties and, therefore, 
can only be opinable. Moreover, as the λόγοι are always homogeneous to the 
objects they address, the same epistemic status granted to the objects grasped 
will be likewise granted to their accounts. Lastly, the examples also tell us 
something about the purpose of accounts in relation to different kinds of 
objects, and about their limitations as well. From the description presented, 
the study of nature (φυσιολογία) would pursue natural causes (αἰτίαι), while 
the study of politics (πολιτική) concerns itself with likelihoods (εἰκότα), 
presumably in political oratory. Interesting too in the case of geometricals is 
the choice of the word ψευδογραφίαι, which does obviously bear any negative 
meaning, but is only meant to express the ‘artificiality’ of diagrams – it does 
not seem to cast doubt on the truth of sense perception of perceptible 
objects, but rather it explains the ontological status of their graphic 
representation.  
As it is noticeable from the examples analysed so far, the only domain 
which is not exemplified is that of νοατά: are these to be identified with 
Forms, or genera and species, or numbers, or proportions, or perfect 
geometricals, or all/some of the above, or something else? One answer might 
be inferred from what ps-Archytas says about mechanics, in a passage that 
occurs after the explanation of the process of recognition of the double λόγος. 
Indeed, the science of mechanics, whose application and products concern 
perceptible bodies directly, but whose laws and rules employ mathematical 
and geometrical terms, might be thought to be emblematic of the account 
that must appeal to both intelligibles and sense-perceptibles.51 Indeed, in 
                                                                          
50 To be sure, the square might exist as such in our thoughts, but ps-Archytas would 
appear to concern himself mostly with whether it, qua geometric object, is grasped by our 
sense-perceptive faculties. See below about how little ps-Archytas says about intelligibles.  
51 This middle status of mechanics (as well as of optics and harmony) is highlighted 
by Aristotle as well in the Posterior Analytics. Indeed, at APo, I, 9, 76a 24, mechanics is 
listed as one of the exceptions to the impossibility of applying a demonstration to a 
different genus, since geometrical proofs actually apply to the propositions of mechanics 
(or optics). In the same book, another passage (ibid., I, 13, 78b 37-79a 7) is particularly 
interesting in relation to the next section of ps-Archytas’ text as it confirms the choice of 
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mechanics, accounts, on the one hand, are grounded in intelligibles because 
they are exemplified by reference to (ideal) figures, numbers and 
proportions; whereas, on the other hand, its finished products (e.g. 
machines) can only be evaluated in reference to objects of sense perception, 
which are subject to motion and enmattered.  
2.4. Body and Soul: Different Domains and Different Objects 
Astonishingly, everything discussed above only refers to the first fragment 
of ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and Sense-Perception. From here forward, we 
will discuss the much longer second fragment, which tends to be less 
compressed than the first fragment and consequently causes less 
consternation for interpreters. Initially, we see ps-Archytas place his 
epistemological theory in a broader relation to his physics and metaphysics:  
Sense-perception comes to be (γίγνεται) in the body, but intellect [comes to be] in 
the soul. For the former is (ὑπάρχει) a principle (ἀρχά) of perceptible things, and the 
latter of intelligible things. For a measure (μέτρον) of plurality is number, of length a 
foot, of weight and its distribution a balance, of uprightness and straightness a level 
and a ruler, respectively – an upright joiner’s square (ὀρθὰ γωνία).52 In the same way, 
too, sensation is a measure of sensible things, whereas intellect is a principle and 
measure of intelligible things. And intellect is a principle of intelligible things and of 
things that are primary by nature (φύσει πρώτα), whereas sense-perception is [a 
principle] of things near us.53 For the former is a principle of the soul, whereas the 
latter is [a principle] of the body. And the intellect is judge of the most honourable 
things (τῶν τιμιαιτάτων κριτάς), whereas sense-perception [is judge of] the things 
that are of the greatest use to us (χρησιμωτάτων). For perception is constituted for 
the sake of the body and for servicing it (ἕνεκε λειτουργίας), whereas intellect is 
                                                                                                                                                                              
mechanics by the fact that it exemplifies a middle position which is in contact with both 
the intelligible and the sensible realms. 
52 It must be noted that the examples provided are precisely those that appear, in the 
same order, in Ptolemy’s On the Kriterion and Hegemonikon (1, 5). But unlike ps-
Archytas, Ptolemy provides a complete description of each of the five items required for a 
cognitive judgment (i.e. the object of judgment (τὸ κρινόμενον), the instrument by which it 
is judged (τὸ δι’ οὗ κρίνεται), the agent of judgement (τὸ κρῖνον), the means by which it is 
judged (τὸ ῷ κρίνεται), and the goal at which the judgement is directed (οὗ ἔνεκεν ἡ κρίσις)) 
in relation to a set of five items required for a judgment in a lawcourt.  
53 There is a lacuna here, and the text, αἴσθασις ἁμῖν, is ungrammatical. Usener added 
<δευτέρων τε φύσι καὶ τῶν παρ’>, whereas Thesleff (followed by Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica 
Dorica) simplified to <τῶν παρ’>. The latter is to be preferred. 
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constituted for the sake of the soul and its sagacity (πολυφραδμοσύνας).54 Moreover, 
the intellect is a principle of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), and sense-perception of opinion 
(δόξα); for the latter [sc. opinion] obtains its actuality (ἐνέργεια) from the sensibles, 
and the former [sc. knowledge] [obtains its actuality] from the intelligibles. Among 
things,55 perceptibles happen to share of (τυγχάνοντι κοινανέοντα) motion and 
alteration, whereas intelligibles [happen to share of] rest and eternity. (ps-Archytas, 
On Intellect and Sense-Perception, Fr. 2, p. 37, 15-38, 1 Thesleff = Stob., Ecl., I, 48, 6, 
p. 315, 3-316, 2 Wachsmuth)  
Τhis section does not provide us with especially crucial information about 
the process of knowledge-acquisition, but rather it serves to contextualise 
intellect and sense-perception in relation to the soul and the body. 
Nonetheless, it helps to clarify some details. Intellect and sense perception 
are now asserted to be principles, respectively, of intelligible things and of 
perceptible things.56 The examples of units of measurement help us to 
understand what this means; just as number is measure (μέτρον) of 
plurality, foot of length, etc., so too sense-perception is measure of 
perceptible things and intellect of intelligible ones. This is perfectly 
consistent with what ps-Archytas had said in Fragment 1 when he asserted 
that the intellect is the criterion (κριτήριον), or standard, for intellectual 
objects (and similarly for sense-perception and its objects). Being correlate 
with the objects they measure, the two faculties are established in relation 
to their respective objects: intelligible things are primary by nature, the 
most honourable, and they partake in rest and eternity; on the contrary, 
perceptible things are closer to us, of greater use, and they partake in 
motion and alteration. Up to this point, this seems perfectly in line with a 
typical Platonic or Platonist two-worlds scheme. But there is a more active 
way in which intellect and sense-perception engage with their respective 
objects: first, they are considered judges (κριταί; cf. τὸ κρῖνον in fragment 1) 
of their respective objects; and second, they are asserted to be also 
principles, respectively, of the soul and of the body, and, accordingly, of 
knowledge and opinion. This would appear to be an extension of the way 
in which they were considered criteria previously. Sense-perception helps 
                                                                          
54 This is a very rare word that shows ps-Archytas’ sometime penchant for poeticism 
(cf. Ulacco, ibid., p. 130). Ulacco renders ‘avvedutezza’, or ‘foresight’; an alternative might 
be something like ‘oversight’.  
55 If this is how to take τῶν πραγμάτων. 
56 The verb ‘is’ here, ὑπάρχει, might be thought to indicate a substantial or persistent 
relationship here. 
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us to grasp them by appeal to itself as criterion or standard of judgment. In 
this way, it can be considered a principle and judge of corporeal objects, as 
it serves and guides us in forming standardized judgements about things 
which are of the greatest use to our bodies. Also, by being the criterion for 
the measurement of perceptible things, it is also the principle of the degree 
of knowledge which corresponds to perceptible objects, namely opinion 
(δόξα).57 The same can be said for intellect in relation to intelligible objects, 
and for the benefit of the soul: by virtue of being the principle of 
intelligible objects, the intellect is also the principle of knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη). In each case, the ‘actuality’ or ‘operation’ (ἐνέργεια) of the 
degree of knowledge corresponds specifically to its proper objects.58  
2.5. The Quadripartite Division of Knowledge 
This constellation of notions of judgment and the degrees of knowledge 
mentioned above leads ps-Archytas to ruminate a bit more on the precise 
relationship between intellect and sense-perception: 
Both sense-perception and intellect are analogous (παραπλησίως ἔχοντι)59 [to one 
another]: for sense-perception is of what is perceived, and what is perceived is both 
put into motion and alters, and it never stays at rest in the same place; therefore, 
[what is perceived] becomes more and less, better and worse, to the eye.60 But intellect 
is of the intelligible, and the intelligible is essentially (ἐξ οὐσίας) unmoved; therefore, 
the intelligible is neither more nor less, better nor worse, to the mind.61 Just as the 
intellect beholds (βλέπει) what is primary, i.e. the paradigm, so sense-perception 
[beholds] what is secondary, i.e. the image. For the intellect [beholds] the heaven 
absolutely, whereas sense-perception [beholds] the sphere of the sun, and the 
                                                                          
57 We will soon learn how this association relates to Plato’s Divided Line in the 
Republic. See below. 
58 Contrast Ptolemy (On the Kriterion and Hegemonikon, 8, 3), who claims that the 
intellect receives sense-perceptions from the sensory faculty and ‘applies’ (ἐπισυνάπτει) 
them to the operations of thought and judgment. 
59 This formulation of analogy is distinctive and appears later on in this text (see 
below) and in the fragment of ps-Brontinus’ On Intellect and Discursive Thought (p. 55, 
22-29 Thesleff), where it is used to compare intelligibles and objects of discursive thought 
(τὰ διανοητά). 
60 Literally, “more and less, better and worse, to see” (ὁρῆν). Ulacco, 
Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 105, opts for “è possibile vederlo diventare…”, but this does 
not faithfully represent the Greek, which has γίνεται ὁρῆν. The infinitive should be 
rendered as an infinitive of purpose (see H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 1956, 2008-2010).  
61 Literally, “more nor less, better nor worse, to think” (νοεῖν). See the previous note. 
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[spheres? works?] of the craftsmen (τὰς χειροτεχνατῶν). (ps-Archytas, On Intellect 
and Sense-Perception, Fr. 2, p. 38, 1-9 Thesleff = Stob., Ecl., I, 48, 6, p. 316, 2-13 
Wachsmuth) 
From this passage forward, ps-Archytas becomes more explicit in his Platonic 
borrowings.62 He has consistently maintained that the objects of intellect 
and sense-perception are different, and here he explains further what it is 
that each faculty ‘beholds’ (βλέπει) or ‘looks to’: the intellect sees the 
paradigm or what remains the same, an example of which is the heavens 
themselves (i.e. the heavens as a unified and consistent system that retains its 
identity); and the sense-perceptive faculty beholds the images or copies of 
that celestial sphere, examples of which are the solar circuit and, one might 
infer from the text, the handiworks of craftsmen (τὰς χειροτεχνατῶν). It is 
unclear whether these handiworks are something like the mortal body parts, 
e.g. heads and eyes, that the gods, who themselves imitate the Demiurge’s 
activities, create in the account of Timaeus (44d-45b) as imitations of the 
perfect shape of the cosmos, or whether they are the actual objects that 
craftsmen make, e.g. tables, which are imitations of the Form of Table 
(although we are inclined to the former interpretation). 
And what is more, the intellect is partless and indivisible (ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος), just 
like a unit or a point, and similarly (παραπλησίως) the intelligible – for the Form (τὸ 
εἶδος) is neither a limit nor a boundary of the body (οὔτε πέρας σώματός ἐστιν οὔτε 
ὅρος), but only an imprint of being, insofar as it is existent63 (τύπωσις τῶ ὄντος, ᾗ ὄν 
ἐστιν), whereas sense-perception is partitive and divisible. For among the things that 
are, some are perceptible, others opinable, others knowable, and others intelligible. 
And bodies, which feature a certain resistance (ἀντιτυπία), are perceptible; those 
things which share of Forms (τὰ μετέχοντα τῶν εἰδέων), like images, are opinable, for 
                                                                          
62 Cf. Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 131-132. 
63 This is a very challenging phrase, which has the tenor of a definition of Form for 
the Hellenistic Pythagoreans, to interpret. Ulacco, ibid., p. 105, opts for “in quanto è ciò 
che è” or “insofar as it is what is”. Centrone, “The pseudo-Pythagorean Writings”, p. 325, 
describes Form here as ‘an ‘impression/imprinting’ (τύπωσις) of things qua things-that-
are’, but one problem with this interpretation is that in the phrase ᾗ ὄν ἐστιν, whatever the 
subject of the adjective ὄν is, it is singular and not plural. Our interpretation takes the 
phrase ὄν ἐστιν periphrastically, with the grammatically unnecessary ἐστιν as emphatic (see 
Smyth, Greek Grammar, 1857). This definition is, to our knowledge, unique within the 
Pythagorean tradition. Compare Aëtius’ account of Pythagoras’ understanding of forms 
and ideas (Plac., I, 10, 11, Dox. 309): “Pythagoras posited that things called ‘forms’ and the 
ideas (τὰ λέγομενα εἴδη καὶ τὰς ἰδέας) in numbers, in their harmonies, and in so-called 
geometrical objects, are inseparable from bodies (ἀχώριστα τῶν σωμάτων)”. 
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example a particular man [shares of the Form] of man, and a particular triangle 
[shares in the Form] of triangle; those things which are by necessity (τὰ συμβεβήκοτα 
ἐξ ἀνάγκας) accidental to the Forms are knowable, e.g., those things which [are by 
necessity accidental] to shapes in geometry; and those things which are the Forms-
themselves and the principles (αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδεα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί) of knowable things are 
intelligible, e.g., the Circle-itself, the Triangle-itself, and the Sphere-itself. Moreover, 
in our very selves, with reference to the soul, there happen to be four types of 
understanding (γνώσεις): intellect, knowledge, opinion, sense-perception. Two of 
these are principles of λόγος, viz. intellect and sense-perception, whereas two are [its] 
ends, viz. knowledge and opinion. What is similar is always able to understand what 
it is similar to (τὸ δ’ ὅμοιον ἀεὶ τῶ ὅμοίω γνωστικόν). Therefore,64 it is clear that, in our 
very selves, the intellect is what is able to understand the intelligibles, just as 
knowledge [is what is able to understand] knowables, opinion opinables, and sense-
perception perceptibles. (ps-Archytas, On Intellect and Sense-Perception, Fr. 2, p. 38, 
9-24 Thesleff = Stob., Ecl., I, 48, 6, p. 316, 13-317, 13 Wachsmuth)  
Here, ps-Archytas provides a fascinating discussion of how to 
conceptualize intellect and sense-perception and their respective objects. 
Intellect is indivisible and does not feature parts, ‘just like’ (καθάπερ) a unit 
and a point, a sentiment that cannot, to our knowledge, be traced directly 
back to any of Plato’s works.65 Instead, the ideas expressed here would 
appear to have originated in the writings of Aristotle. In On the Soul, 
Aristotle himself refers to his lost dialogue On Philosophy, where he ascribes 
a peculiar epistemological view to Plato and his school: 
In the same way, Plato too in the Timaeus fashions the soul out of the elements; for 
[he holds that] what is similar is understood by what it is similar to (γινώσκεσθαι τῷ 
ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον), and that things exist out of the elements. A similar division is 
expounded too in the dialogue On Philosophy: the Animal-itself [is fashioned] out of 
the Idea-itself of the One and of the primary length, width, and depth (αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον 
ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους), and 
everything else in a similar way. Moreover, and in different terms: the One is 
intellect, the Dyad is knowledge (for it [strives] in a single direction for unity 
(μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἕν), the number of the plane is opinion, and the number of the solid 
                                                                          
64 This is the beginning of the section quoted by Iamblichus (Comm. Math., 8, p. 36, 
3-10 Festa-Klein). 
65 In Metaphysics Δ (6, 1016b 20-26), while attempting to define the One according 
to its essence, Aristotle asserts that it is a principle of the understandability (ἀρχὴ τοῦ 
γνωστοῦ) for each thing. It is at this point that Aristotle describes the kind of One “which 
is indivisible in quantity and qua quantity” as the unit and the point. They both share in 
being indivisible in any direction or dimension, but they are differentiated only by 
position: the unit does not have position, whereas the point does. This sort of distinction 
might be thought to underlie what ps-Archytas is saying. 
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is sense-perception. The numbers were called the “Forms-themselves” and the 
“principles”, and they [are fashioned] out of the elements; and things are judged 
(κρίνεται) some by the intellect, others by knowledge, others by opinion, and others 
by sense-perception. And these numbers are Forms of things. (Aristotle, On the Soul, 
I, 2, 404b 16-27; emphasis our own) 
Here, ps-Archytas seems to be adapting what he found in Aristotle’s lost 
On Philosophy, but in the near total loss of that work, it is almost 
impossible to know what exactly the modifications are.66 Be that as it may, 
it is clear that both ps-Archytas and the Platonist account of Aristotle from 
On Philosophy commit to a four-fold division of beings (τὰ ἐόντα), familiar 
from Aëtius’ description of Pythagorean epistemology above, according to 
their knowability within ourselves, with ps-Archytas’ account pursuing 
these lines:  
 
Faculty Epistemic 
Functions 
Objects Ontological 
Classifications 
Examples 
Intellect 
(νόος) 
Principle 
(ἀρχή) 
Intelligibles 
(τὰ νοατά) 
Forms/(Ultimate) 
Principles 
(αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδεα καὶ αἱ 
ἀρχαί) 
 
Man-itself, 
Triangle-itself, 
Circle-itself, 
Sphere-itself 
Knowledge 
(ἐπιστάμα) 
End 
(τέλος) 
Knowables 
(τὰ ἐπιστατά) 
Necessary Accidents 
(τὰ τοῖς εἴδεσι 
συμβεβηκότα ἐξ 
ἀνάγκας) 
 
Accidents to 
Geometrical 
Shapes  
Opinion 
(δόξα) 
End 
(τέλος) 
 
Opinables 
(τὰ δοξαστά) 
Particulars 
(τὰ μετέχοντα τῶν 
εἰδέων ὡς αἱ εἰκόνες) 
Particular Man, 
Particular 
Triangle 
Sense-
Perception 
(αἴσθασις) 
Principle 
(ἀρχή) 
Perceptibles 
(τὰ αἰσθατά) 
Bodies/[Immediate 
Principles] 
(τὰ σώματα) 
 
(none specified) 
                                                                          
66 This is not the place to discuss whether the ideas expressed here reflect the 
philosophical views of Plato or one of his students (cf. Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, 
p. 145-146); it is also not the place to discuss the extent to which ps-Archytas borrowed 
from Aristotle’s On Philosophy, although this comparison alone demonstrates the 
potential for such an analysis. We have underlined the passages that show strong 
similarities. 
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What is interesting here for our purposes is the relationship between the 
ontological classification of the objects and the examples given (or 
implied). Intelligibles, which function as ultimate principles for knowledge, 
are understood to be Forms that are not expressly subject to any kind of 
motion or division, and examples given are Form-mathematicals (e.g. 
Circle-itself) and genera (e.g. Man-itself); knowables, which are the ends of 
intellective activity, are accidents that obtain necessarily to geometrical 
shapes – one thinks ps-Archytas is referring to properties that are necessary 
for identifying an object, such as the property of “having the sum of its 
angles equal to two right angles”, in the case of a triangle;67 opinables, 
which are the ends of sense-perceptive activity, are particulars like “this 
man Socrates” or “this triangle here”; and perceptibles, which are the 
principles of the formation of opinions, are individual bodies which feature 
extension and articulation, but perhaps haven’t yet been assigned in any 
way to a category (i.e. they haven’t obtained any content as such).  
What, we might ask, is the relationship between these objects of 
knowledge? How do the epistemic functions relate to the knowledge-
process? These questions are addressed at the coda to this section: 
Therefore, it is necessary for thought (διάνοια) to pass (μεταβαίνεν) from perceptibles 
to opinables, from opinables to knowables, and from these to intelligibles. The truth 
(ἁ ἀλάθεια), once it has been contemplated (θεωρουμένα) through them, make these 
things consonant (σύμφωνα). (ps-Archytas, On Intellect and Sense-Perception, Fr. 2, p. 
38, 24-39, 3 Thesleff = Iambl., On the General Mathematical Science, 8, p. 36, 10-14 
Festa-Klein)  
Ps-Archytas concludes this section by describing, for the first time in his 
treatise, the vehicle by which the four cognitive faculties are able to 
communicate: this is ‘thought’, or perhaps ‘discursive thought’ (διάνοια). 
The communication implied by διάνοια is a sort of inferential analysis 
upwards (μεταβαίνεν) through the various levels of understanding.68 There 
                                                                          
67 Cf. Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 143, who refers to a passage of Aristotle 
(Metaph., V, 30, 1025a 30-34) where he describes a type of accident (συμβεβηκός) “that 
belongs to each thing in itself (καθ’ αὑτό), but not in its essence (ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ)”, which can 
be eternal. 
68 To be clear, we believe that this process moves upwards from the ontological point of 
view, but it need not have any vertical component in reference to epistemology. In general, 
compare with Philo, On Dreams, I, 185-187 (= 13J Boys-Stones; transl. Boys-Stones): “The 
intelligible cosmos, constituted by the forms within his agent by God’s patronage, can only 
be grasped by inference from this perceptible and visible cosmos: one cannot get an 
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is no explicit reference to ‘imagination’ (φαντασία), which is remarkable 
given the contexts for Hellenistic psychology and possible models for ps-
Archytas’ text within the Pythagorean tradition.69 Unfortunately, with 
regard to ‘truth’, it is difficult to know what ps-Archytas is saying here, 
especially since the text is not secure.70 The activity of a synoptic 
contemplation of the truth of the statements that inform the λόγοι, which 
takes the form of assessing their validity and soundness, is what harmonizes 
the statements with reality. We are reminded of another text of ps-
Archytas, On Wisdom, which concludes with a similar sentiment: 
Therefore, whoever is able to reduce (ἀναλῦσαι) all the genera under one and the same 
principle and, again, synthesize and calculate (συνθεῖναι τε καὶ συναριθμήσασθαι) them, 
he seems to me to be the wisest and absolutely truest (σοφῶτατος καὶ παναληθέστατος). 
And yet he will also discover a good lookout position, from which he will be able to 
behold (κατοψεῖσθαι) god and all things that have been assigned to his column and 
order; and furnishing himself with this charioteer’s path, he will set out and arrive at 
the end of the course, connecting the beginnings with the conclusions (τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῖς 
πέρασι συνάψαντα), and finding out why (ἐπιγνόντα διότι) god is the beginning, end, 
and middle of all things-that-are defined in accordance with justice and right reason. 
(ps-Archytas, On Wisdom, Fr. 5, p. 44, 31-45, 4 Thesleff)  
Once ps-Archytas’ “wisest and absolutely truest” philosopher reaches the 
ecstatic heights of epoptic vision, he understands not only the validity of 
the connections drawn between the initial premises and final conclusions; 
he also understands why (διότι) the beginning, end, and middle parts of the 
true syllogism are divine.71 
                                                                                                                                                                              
intellectual grasp of any of the incorporeal things that exist except by taking one’s start from 
bodies”. On διάνοια in Plato and Aristotle, see, inter alia, M. Duncombe, “Thought as 
Internal Speech in Plato and Aristotle”, Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 19, 2016, 
p. 105-125. 
69 Φαντασία only appears once in the writings of ps-Archytas (On the Good and 
Happy Man, Fr. 8, p. 12, 16 Thesleff), where it refers to arrogant musicians who, 
abandoning the truth, seek to control people who are inexperienced in music through 
their “certain false fantasy” (φαντασίᾳ τινὶ ψευδεῖ). Hence, φαντασία would not appear to 
play any significant role in ps-Archytas’ epistemology. Contrast Anonymus Photii (p. 241, 
1 Thesleff), who described φαντασία as one of the eight instruments of understanding, 
which he defined as “motion in the soul” (see n. 20 above). 
70 We adopt Thesleff’s conjecture (ποιεῖ ἁ θεωρουμένα) for the Mss. ποιητά 
θεωρουμένα. 
71 On this fragment, see Horky, “Pseudo-Archytas’ Protreptics?”, p. 36-39. 
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2.6. Ps-Archytas’ Divided Line 
The treatise as it survives closes with a reflection upon Plato’s Divided Line 
(Resp., VI, 509d 6-511e 5). This passage is notable in terms of its reception 
of Plato and its relationship to other Middle Platonist interpretations: 
After these things have been differentiated, it is necessary to consider (νοῆσαι) the 
following. For as one divides a line by cutting it into, and once again those equal 
sections by cutting them [into two] according to the same proportion (ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν 
λόγον), so too must one divide the intelligible as against the visible (ποττὸ ὁρατόν), 
and again differentiate each [section] in the same way, and [it is necessary] to 
distinguish them from one another according to clarity and obscurity. In the same 
way, then, one section of the perceptible is those things that are images [reflected] in 
water and in mirrors, and the other part is those things of which the former things 
are images: plants and animals. One [part] of the intelligible, which is analogous to 
the images, is the kinds that concern mathematicals (τὰ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα γένη); for 
those who concern themselves with geometry, when they hypothesize the even and 
the odd, figures, and three species of angles, work out the rest from these, and leave 
aside the [real] things (τὰ πράγματα ἐῶντι), as if they know them (ὡς εἰδότες), and 
they are not able to give an account [of the real things] either to themselves or to 
others. But they employ perceptibles, like an image, and they do not pursue these 
[real] things, nor yet do they construct their arguments for their sake, but as to the 
diagonal and the square itself (τᾶς διαμέτρω χάριν καὶ αὐτῶ τετραγώνω). The other 
section of the intelligible is the [part] that dialectic is concerned with; for this 
[assumes] real hypotheses [to be] hypotheses, but it posits principles and steps72 in 
order that it might advance in the direction of the principle of everything as far as 
what is unhypothesized; and again, once this has been attained, it goes back down to 
the conclusion without employing any perceptible additionally, but [only] the 
Forms themselves in themselves. In the case of these four sections, it is also good to 
distribute the affections of the soul; and it is good to call “intellection” (νόασις) what 
is at the highest [part], “thought” (διάνοια) what is at the second [part]; “belief” 
(πίστις) what is at the third [part], and “illusion” (εἰκασία) what is at the fourth 
[part]. (ps-Archytas, On Intellect and Sense-Perception, Fr. 2, p. 39, 3-25 Thesleff = 
Iambl., On the General Mathematical Science, 8, p. 36, 14-37, 19 Festa-Klein) 
                                                                          
72 There are various textual problems here. The Mss. read ἀυτὰ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι τὰς 
ὑποθέσιας ἀλλ’ ὑποθέσιας, ἀλλ’ ἀρχάς τε καὶ ἐπιβάσιας ποιεῖται. Most editors excise the first 
ἀλλ’, but this doesn’t solve the problem of ps-Archytas advocating for ‘principles’ to lead 
up to the ‘principle of everything’. Plato’s original text (Resp., VI, 511b 5-6) had τὰς 
ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς (“positing 
hypotheses that are not principles, but true hypotheses, like steps and positions to start 
from”), and we might imagine that something along these lines was intended in ps-
Archytas’ text.  
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As Ulacco has suggested, this passage presents a synthesis of Plato’s text, 
albeit with some minor modifications of terminology; it is actually quite 
remarkable how many exact or near-exact phrases ps-Archytas retains. So 
we might think this passage constitutes a mere epitome. Still, there are two 
things that make ps-Archytas’ Divided Line interesting. Firstly, it is 
remarkable that ps-Archytas shows approval of Plato’s own terminology of 
νόησις, διάνοια, πίστις, and εἰκασία at the end of the passage – as though the 
author here were the original Archytas of Tarentum giving his blessing to 
Plato! Secondly, the fact that ps-Archytas follows the text of Plato so 
closely comes into conflict with what he has asserted previously in the 
treatise. For ps-Archytas diverges from Plato’s Divided Line in holding, as 
we saw above, that διάνοια passes throughout the entire range of cognitive 
faculties and objects – from perceptibles through opinables and knowables 
to intelligibles (Plato of course held in the Divided Line that διάνοια is to 
be associated with the second, geometrical, portion of the intelligible).73 
Indeed, it is διάνοια that presents ps-Archytas and some Middle Platonists 
with some of the greatest interpretive challenges.74 Consider the only 
surviving fragment of ps-Brontinus’ On Intellect and Discursive Thought: 
Discursive thought (διάνοια) is greater (μεῖζον)75 than intellect, and the object of 
discursive thought [is greater than] the intelligible: for intellect is what is simple, 
uncombined, and the primary subject and object of intellection (τὸ πρᾶτον νοέον καὶ 
τὸ νοεόμενον) (and the Form is of this sort; for it is partless and uncombined and 
primary among the other things), but discursive thought is manifold, partitive, and 
the secondary subject of intellection (for it additionally takes on knowledge and 
reasoning (ἐπιστάμαν γὰρ καὶ λόγον προσείληφε)). And, similarly, with the objects of 
discursive thought: for these are things known and demonstrated, and generally 
things that are comprehended by the intellect through reasoning (τὰ καθόλω τὰ ὑπὸ 
τῶ νόω διὰ τῶ λόγω καταλαμβανόμενα). (ps-Brontinus, On Intellect and Discursive 
Thought, Fr. 1, p. 55, 22-29 Thesleff = Iambl., On the General Mathematical Science, 
8, p. 34, 21-35, 6 Festa-Klein)  
In some ways, ps-Brontinus presents a middle road between Plato’s 
Divided Line and ps-Archytas’ quadripartition of knowledge: like ps-
Archytas, he accepts that intelligibles like Forms are partless and generally 
                                                                          
73 Plat., Resp., VI, 511d 2-5. 
74 Cf. Ulacco’s contextualization of ps-Brontinus with the ideas of Alcinous and 
Plutarch (Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 162-164). 
75 Iamblichus (Comm. Math., 8, p. 35, 7) interprets this to mean greater ‘in quantity’ 
(τῷ πλήθει) rather than ‘in power’ (τῇ δυνάμει). 
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indivisible; but like Plato, he associates διάνοια with the secondary objects, 
which ps-Archytas considers ‘knowables’ (τὰ ἐπιστατά). Ps-Brontinus even 
makes sure to associate διάνοια with the two activities that, broadly 
speaking, characterize ps-Archytas’ knowables: reasoning (λόγος) and 
demonstration (ἀπόδειξις). Finally, like ps-Archytas, ps-Brontius asserts a 
close relationship between primary and secondary objects: ps-Archytas 
holds that intelligibles actualize knowledge and functions as their 
principles, and ps-Brontinus that objects of discursive thought are grasped 
(καταλαμβανόμενα) by the intellect when reasoning intercedes. We might 
wish to recall, however, that ps-Archytas strictly forbade the possibility of 
the intellect itself understanding knowables, due to his strict distribution 
of faculties to their respective domains. Whether or not ps-Brontinus 
would disagree with this depends on what exactly ps-Brontinus means 
when he speaks of τὰ ὑπὸ τῶ νόω διὰ τῶ λόγω καταλαμβανόμενα – the text is 
too brief to be sure.76 But we will see that its presence here did not escape 
the notice of Aëtius, to whom we turn in the conclusion. 
3. Conclusions 
If we return to Aëtius’ description of Pythagorean epistemology 
mentioned in the introduction to this paper, we can now see more clearly 
how the doxographical report has interpreted the text of ps-Archytas 
(assuming that the transmission of influence goes from the more complex 
and nuanced text of ps-Archytas to the simpler doxographical report). 
Aëtius takes the fourfold division of faculties/beings and filters it through 
the typical lens of Hellenistic philosophy, with ps-Archytas’ quadrivium 
                                                                          
76 The closest comparison we can find to these passages is in Philo (The Special Laws, 
I, 46-49), where God responds to Moses by asserting that His powers/qualities and 
essence cannot be comprehended (ἀκατάληπτοι) by humans – neither by sense-perception 
nor by mind – although they present “a certain impress and copy of their activity” 
(ἐκμαγεῖόν τι καὶ ἀπειόνισμα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείας). He goes on to name “some” humans 
who “name these “ideas” since they bring form to everything that exist, put into order 
everything that is disordered, give limit to what is unlimited, definition to what lacks 
definition, and shape to what is shapeless”. He concludes this fascinating passage by 
claiming that the spectacle of the universe is “comprehended not by the eyes of the body 
but by the unresting eyes of thought” (οὐ σώματος ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀλλὰ τοῖς διανοίας ἀκοιμήτοις 
ὄμμασι καταλαμβάνεσθαι).  
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of intellect (νόος), knowledge (ἐπιστάμα), opinion (δόξα), and sense-
perception (αἴσθασις) being classified accordingly: 
 
 
Faculty  Epistemic Activities Materials it Works 
With 
Examples  
Intellect 
(νοῦς), or ‘Monad’  
(ἡ μονάς) 
 Contemplation in 
respect of unit 
(κατὰ μονάδα θεωρεῖ) 
Forms and Kinds in 
respect of units  
(τὰ εἴδη καὶ γένη κατὰ 
μονάδας) 
Qualified 
Forms/Kinds, 
e.g. ‘rational 
Man-itself’’ 
 
Knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη), or 
‘Indefinite Dyad’  
(ἡ δυὰς ἀόριστος) 
   
‘Comprehension’ 
(κατάληψις), i.e. bring 
to conclusion (συνάγει) 
syllogisms  
 
 
Demonstrations and 
proofs 
(ἀποδείξεις καὶ πίστεις) 
 
None given 
 
Opinion (δόξα), or 
‘Triad’ (ἡ τριάς) 
  
Unclear77 
 
 
‘Many’ (πλῆθος) 
qualified particulars 
 
‘Thrice-Blessed 
Danaans’ 
 
*Sense-Perception 
(αἴσθησις) 
  
*Unknown 
 
*Unknown 
 
*Unknown 
What emerges by way of comparison with ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and 
Sense-Perception is that Aëtius has added crucial information not found in 
the original text. With regard to all four faculties, he assigns a numerological 
title (‘Monad’ for intellect, ‘Indefinite Dyad’ for knowledge, etc.) which 
helps to explain each faculty’s epistemic activities: intellect contemplates 
Forms or Kinds with an eye to unity, whereas knowledge takes two 
contradictory views and adjudicates between them by moving through 
agreed premises to a conclusion – by moving from disagreement to 
agreement. For Aëtius, intellect still deals with Forms and Kinds, and it also 
admits essential qualities that identify each kind, e.g. ‘rational’ Man-itself; 
but notice how mathematical Forms have dropped out entirely for intellect, 
and the essential qualities of mathematical objects for knowledge.78 The 
                                                                          
77 Aëtius claims that it is by virtue of opinion’s being ‘many’ (πλῆθος) that it is a 
triad, and that it arises ‘out of comprehension’ (ἐκ καταλήψεως), but he does not explain 
exactly how these are meant to relate to one another. 
78 To be sure, these omissions could be explained by the abbreviated presentation of 
the doxography. 
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other very notable presence is the notion of ‘comprehension’ (κατάληψις), 
which is associated with knowledge/the Indefinite Dyad and would appear 
to be the basis for opinion, but which never appears, in any form, in the 
fragments of ps-Archytas. But we will recall that it does appear at the end of 
the fragment of ps-Brontinus’ On Intellect and Discursive Thought, where ps-
Brontinus claims that διάνοια pursues “things that are comprehended by the 
intellect through reasoning” (τὰ ὑπὸ τῶ νόω διὰ τῶ λόγω καταλαμβανόμενα). 
Remarkably, either Aëtius has sought to arbitrarily associate ps-Archytas’ 
ἐπιστάμα with (a broadly) Hellenistic79 κατάληψις, or, as we believe, he has 
combined the accounts of ps-Archytas’ ἐπιστάμα and ps-Brontinus’ διάνοια 
into a single ‘Pythagorean’ synthesis, a unified theory of Pythagorean 
epistemology that, unsurprisingly, is associated with “Pythagoras of Samos, 
son of Mnesarchus” (Aët., Plac., I, 3, 8, Dox. 280). By comparing Aëtius’ 
doxographical account with the surviving epistemological fragments of ps-
Archytas and ps-Brontinus, not only do we see the gradual emergence of a 
broad Hellenistic/post-Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology; we also bear 
witness to the doxographical method employed to make this curious and 
somewhat original epistemological system ‘Pythagorean’. 
We conclude that ps-Archytas offers a complex account of the process 
of understanding and the cognitive faculties involved in it. By making use of 
and exploiting Platonic and Aristotelian notions, ps-Archytas develops an 
account for the acquisition and production of knowledge which goes well 
beyond the foundations it stands upon by developing its own Pythagorean 
criteriology. At the beginning of the treatise, ps-Archytas provides us with 
a presentation of the objects populating this world and classified on the 
basis of their understandability (either autoevident or non-autoevident). 
He stipulates that only immediately manifest objects, which can be 
comprehensively divided into intelligibles and perceptibles, have as criteria 
for understanding them, respectively, intellect and sense-perception. From 
the beginning, the treatise reveals that the main concern is not to provide 
an account of the criterion of the truth, as other Hellenistic schools might 
have it, but of the criterion of being. The effectiveness of our intellective 
and sense-perceptive faculties to transmit truth is never questioned: 
immediately manifest objects are straightaway evident to their respective 
                                                                          
79 We do not wish to associate this concept expressly with one school or another. 
What is clear, however, is that this conceptualization does not in any way reflect the Stoic 
notion of the ‘kataleptic impression’ (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία). 
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cognitive faculties and stimulate the process of understanding. What is 
initially judged by these faculties, and what needs to be verified once again 
by the faculties at the end of the process is, somewhat surprisingly, the 
account related to their objects and accomplished by our reasoning. By 
shifting the discussion away from the philosophical pitfalls that 
characterise Hellenistic debates, ps-Archytas offers a detailed account of 
the role that intellect and sense-perception play in constructing accounts 
related to the objects they evaluate. The text suggests that we should 
understand the process as two-fold, involving diverse operations in the 
cases of intelligibles and perceptibles. The acquisition and elaboration of 
data for understanding is articulated in three steps: first, an initial 
acquisition of the material performed by sense-perception (obtaining the 
τὸ ὅτι ἐστιν, or the τὸ οὕτως ἔχει) or the intellect (acquiring the τί ἐστιν), 
respectively; and second, an articulation and determination of this 
material, authorized by the intellect in both cases, which produces an 
account of the object in question. When addressing perceptible objects, the 
account deals with both individuals and universals; when addressing 
intelligible objects, it deals with universals only. This step of the 
knowledge-process is fundamental and guarantees the status of each faculty 
as a criterion of its objects: it makes sure that the account, which is 
syllogistic, is homogeneous with the objects it addresses, and it constitutes 
the basis for the production of valid propositional facts (in the case of 
individual sensible objects), or explanatory reasons for the facts (the τὸ δία 
τι). Third, the account is verified, once again, by one of the two faculties: 
sense-perception tests whether the conclusion is sound, and intellect 
confirms whether the inferences drawn have been valid.  
As principles, these cognitive faculties function as criteria for all objects 
in existence, but the epistemological system as a whole requires ends as well. 
This commitment to teleology allows ps-Archytas to associate the 
intellective and sense-perceptive faculties with principles of the soul and the 
body, and, consequently, of the ends, knowledge and opinion, respectively. 
Indeed, on the one hand, our intellective and sense-perceptive faculties guide 
us by providing us with judgments about things which are useful for our soul 
or our body; on the other hand, insofar as they work as the criteria for 
intelligibles and perceptibles, intellect and sense-perception are also 
principles of the appropriate knowledge for those objects, namely, 
knowledge and opinion – the end points of the processes. In this way, ps-
Archytas successfully adapts the ontological classifications in Plato’s Divided 
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Line by avoiding a rigid dichotomic distinction and allowing for a more 
continuous conception of the process of knowledge and of their related 
objects. Far from the initial doxographical account provided by ‘Hippolytus’, 
Hellenistic/post-Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology is revealed to be 
much less rooted in mysticism and numerology than one might expect. On 
the contrary, by softening Platonic distinctions through appeal to nuances 
derived mostly from Aristotelian epistemology, ps-Archytas achieves a more 
continuous conception of reality which grants διάνοια the capacity to range 
throughout the entirety of understandable objects, thus advancing a 
coherent epistemological process that recognizes the specific competences of 
each cognitive faculty. 
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